The self-appointed custodians of the national interest have been outraged at the temerity of the self-appointed custodians of the constitution and the petulance of the self-appointed custodians of the public interest.
The self-appointed custodians of the constitution have been shocked that anyone could upbraid them for upholding the constitution without fear or favour.
And the self-appointed custodians of the public interest — those paragons of virtue who hector and lecture and preach from their televised bully pulpits each evening — cannot believe anyone could question their motives or intentions.
There is a word to describe it all, but it’s probably best not printed in a family newspaper.
What does it all mean?
It’s a strange world in which everyone is clamouring to be the target of an army chief’s wrath.
In eras past, a sidelong glance or a misspoken sentence by the chief would have had folks preparing their resignation letters or reaching for their passports.
Not anymore.
He meant me! No, he meant us! No, no, we were the targets!
The ostensible targets are squabbling over who was the main target.
Rule No 1: when folks argue over who was the primary target, look elsewhere for the primary target.
The army high command has two principal constituencies: the rank and file and the public at large.
In the best of worlds, both can be kept happy simultaneously. In the not-so-elegant Pakistani universe, keeping both happy simultaneously isn’t always possible.
The armed forces are restless. They are being barracked and shellacked like never before. If the army were running the show directly, they would understand to some extent. If the army were overtly interfering in politics, they’d take it on the chin.
But it’s a new world out there. The old order is crumbling, the locus of power is shifting and the army is feeling harassed and aggrieved. They’re just trying to do their job — defend Pakistan — but no one seems to understand.
Steps up the chief to reassure his skittish tribe. I’m here, I’m on your side, I’ll stand up for all that is great and good, i.e. us.
If that means a swipe or two against other institutions and pillars, so be it. To the skittish armed forces, swipes against others are the kind of red meat they crave.
Talk tough and you look tough, and looking tough is hardwired into the military psyche.
But that’s also why everyone else has almost gleefully leapt on the chief’s words and claimed they were meant for them.
For words are not actions and without actions, everyone else senses impotence.
Show us what you’ve got, the media has taunted and the court has almost roared, guessing that blanks were fired to please the army’s principal constituency.
More curious has been the PPP’s response, of which two distinct strands were discernible the past week.
One camp argued the party had been kept in the loop by the chief, a signal that this wasn’t about the PPP and the government but about the robes and the preachers on TV.
There was almost smug elation in this camp, like schoolyard victims who’ve discovered the big, bad bullies have turned on each other and left the victims to walk off with the prom queen, in this case a clearer path to re-election.
When your enemies fight among themselves, they’re less likely to see you as the enemy.
The other camp was eyeing Balochistan warily, sensing a dry run there for bigger things on the national stage.
The sparring between the army and the court is a sideshow, according to this PPP camp. Instead, the Balochistan template is seen emerging:
Army keeps security situation messy by eschewing the political for a military approach; court pounces on mess to declare government has lost its writ; next step: wrap up government and install an efficient and establishment-friendly government.
Take the testing of the judicial waters in Balochistan and magnify it to the national level and you end up with that rumour that just won’t die: an extended caretaker set-up, with elections postponed.
Convoluted? You bet.
But it hints at the undercurrents everyone knows exist, though few know which direction they’re pulling in.
Elections have a way of unsettling everyone here. Last year, around this time, the Senate elections were on the horizon and the speculation and rumours began to grow.
Somehow, somewhere, something would happen to prevent the Senate elections from being held on schedule.
If the Senate was a prize worth winning — or, conversely, denying — and hence the speculation and uncertainty in the run-up to the Senate elections, a general election is of an order of magnitude greater.
Surely, the great unseen and the unknown would not countenance a hammer blow. PPP wins, PML-N wins, whoever wins wearing a civilian cloak, the establishment loses.
The Mehrangate judgment has laid bare just how terrified the swaggering men in uniform were of a girl with a voice and with the people behind her.
Two decades on, a full civilian term leading to an election with another full term a possibility — the beast may have grown weak but its instincts will be the same: civilians win; establishment loses.
Since the past informs the present, at least in terms of perception, the uncertainty will grow as a general election inches closer. And so will the howling and the bickering and the confusion.
But there is a problem: the closer the election draws, the less time there is to engineer a derailment.
Even in the land of perma-crisis, some crises need time to gestate if the inevitable is to be delayed.
And time is running out.
Still, the rumour mill is quietly throwing out a date: watch out for January.
But it may already be too late.
An on-time election looks about as likely as anything can be in this land of unlikely events.
The writer is a member of staff.
cyril.a@gmail.com
Twitter: @cyalm
Published in Dawn, November 11th, 2012.
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Well-known historians have all maintained that to Jinnah the Muslims of undivided India were a separate cultural entity requiring their own homeland.
Jinnah’s desire to see this through was born from his awkwardness with the idea of a post-colonial India subjugated by the ‘Hindu-dominated’ Indian National Congress: even though the Congress was almost entirely secular.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that Jinnah’s push to carve out a separate Muslim country was made in order to construct an Islamic state.
For years Pakistanis have debated about how Jinnah went about claiming Pakistan. Was he able to think it through, or did he fail to perceive the vulnerability of his claim?
Many also believe that his claim in this respect was too open-ended. That’s why it was easily exploited by some who eventually turned it into a monolithic entity and a militaristic bastion of Islam.
It is ironic that the first Pakistani head of state to sincerely try to realise Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan was a military dictator. Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s regime (1959-69) still remains perhaps the most secular in the country’s history.
Apart from, of course, sidelining the democratic aspects of Jinnah’s concept, Ayub otherwise went about defining (through legislation) his understanding of Jinnah’s Pakistan.
To him it was about a secular Muslim majority state sustained by the genius of entrepreneurial action, a strong military, and the spirit of modernistic and progressive Islam of the likes of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Iqbal and Jinnah.
However, in a naturally pluralistic society like Pakistan with multiple ethnicities, religions and Islamic sects, if one takes out democracy from the above equation, one would get (as Ayub did) ethnic strife, religious reactionary-ism and class conflict.
The class-based and multi-ethnic commotion in this respect opened windows of opportunity for well-organised leftist groups who were not only successful in forcing Ayub out (1969), but they also eschewed the religious opposition to the Field Marshal’s government.
Left parties like the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), National Awami Party (NAP), and student groups like the National Students Federation (NSF), in the former West Pakistan, achieved this by attacking Ayub’s ‘pro-rich policies’ (state-facilitated capitalism), and, on the other hand, neutralised the Islamic fundamentalists by adding a new twist to Jinnah’s image.
For example, the PPP advocated Jinnah to be a progressive democrat whose thinking was close to the ideas of ‘Islamic socialism’ first purported (in the region) by such leaders of the Pakistan Movement, as Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, and Iqbal.
After the breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971, and the coming to power of the PPP (led by Z A. Bhutto), the authoritarian centre-right secularism of the Ayub era (and concept of Jinnah), moved towards the populist left.
But the Bhutto regime was highly mutable. Though it remained populist, it regularly shifted from left to right on an issue to issue basis.
A study of Jinnah’s quotes used on state-owned media of the period suggests a regime trying to push Jinnah as a democrat who was not secular in the western sense, but a progressive Muslim whose faith was pluralistic in essence and ‘awami’ (populist).
Such quotes, that became a mainstay just before the main 9pm news bulletin on the state-owned PTV, suddenly changed track when Bhutto was toppled in a reactionary military coup by General Ziaul Haq (July 1977).
From 1977 onwards, no more was Jinnah being bounced between Ayubian secularists and Bhutto’s Islamic Socialists. He now became the property of the ‘Islam-pasand’ (pro-Islamic state) lot.
PTV and Radio Pakistan were ordered to only use those quotes from Jinnah’s speeches that contained the word ‘Islam’.
A concentrated effort was made to remould him into a leader who conceived Pakistan as an Islamic state with a strong military.
In 1978, the order of Jinnah’s celebrated motto, ‘Unity, Faith, Discipline,’ was reshuffled to put the word ‘faith’ first instead of the middle.
Then Zia’s information ministry suddenly unearthed a diary kept by Jinnah in which he had supposedly expressed his desire to see Pakistan as a country run on Islamic laws (instead of democracy), and emphasised the political and ideological role of the military. The diary turned out to be a desperate forgery.
Also, Jinnah’s August 11 speech was expunged from the school textbooks, as if it never existed.
By the end of Zia’s dictatorship (1988), Jinnah had been turned into a pious, 20th century caliph of sorts who presided over the creation of a ‘citadel of Islam’.
However, a decade later during the self-contradictory military dictatorship of General Parvez Musharraf: who was advertising himself as an updated version of Ayub Khan: Jinnah was made to slightly shed the facial hair that Zia had hung on him. Jinnah now became an enlightened moderate.
But Jinnah’s emergence of (now) becoming a moderate Muslim, at once clashed with his more pious, quasi-Islamist image that was cultivated for more than a decade by the Zia regime. This reignited the debate about exactly who or what Jinnah really was.
Today, with Pakistan facing the deadly spectre of Islamist terrorism, growing societal conservatism, a free (and somewhat anarchic) media, an activistic judiciary and the steady resurgence of the secular Muslim intellectual: all trying to figure (or refigure) Jinnah, something unprecedented happened.
Not since the Ayub dictatorship and during the early years of Bhutto’s government has a mainstream political party openly described Jinnah as a progressive, secular Muslim. But recently the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) did just that.
Well, this means at least in Karachi, the Jinnah who wanted a progressive, secular and democratic Muslim majority country is back. And this time he’s not confronting grumpy Islamic parties, but a monster that not only considers him a heretic, but a majority of Pakistani Muslims too.
Published in Dawn, November 11th, 2012.
What do the generals want? The Pakistan Army, like all other institutions, is a pyramid. But the Pakistan Army, unlike any other Pakistani institution, is the only Pakistani institution where soldiers rise from within to become commanding generals purely on the basis of merit. This military pyramid rests on two pillars: respect for the chain of command and the confidence of Pakistanis in their armed forces.
As of right now, Pakistan Army’s two serving generals, 22 serving lieutenant generals, 150 serving major generals for a total of 620,000 Pakistani soldiers are in a state of war. This is the longest – and the bloodiest – war that the Pakistan Army has ever fought. This war has multiple fronts – Tirah Valley, Shawal Valley, Wana, Miranshah, Mir Ali, Swat, Sararogha, Bajaur, Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram. This is a war where the distinction between a combatant and a non-combatant is blurring. This is a war where the distinction between a soldier and a civilian is blurring – even the distinction between war and politics is blurring. This war truly has all the characteristics of a 4G war.
Then there’s India with its ‘cold start military doctrine’. Then there’s the Indian army with its ‘Order of battle’, whereby at least half of all Indian army corps are stationed within a striking distance from the Pakistan-India border. The Indian army’s XV Corps with two infantry divisions in Srinagar, XIV Corps in Leh, XVI Corps with three infantry divisions, an artillery brigade and an armoured brigade in Nagrota, X Corps in Bhatinda, XI Corps in Jalandhar, IX Corps in Yol and II Corps in Ambala.
Remember, generals around the world respond to ‘capacity’ not ‘intent’. Pakistani generals look at the Indian Army and see its inventory of 6,384 tanks as a threat (since none of those Arjun MBTs can cross the Himalayas into China, they must all be for Pakistan).
Pakistani generals look at the Indian Air Force and see its inventory of 672 combat aircraft as a threat. Pakistani generals look at the Indian Army and find that XV, IX, XVI, XIV, XI, X and II Corps all pointing their guns at Pakistan. The Pakistani generals look at India’s 4th Armoured Division, 12th Infantry Division, 340th Mechanised Brigade and the 4th Armoured Brigade deployed to cut Pakistan into two halves.
As of right now, the Pakistan Army is fighting a deadly 4G war within and must, at the same time, stand prepared to defend Pakistan from the 3G threat from the east. In essence, the Pakistan Army is fighting at three different levels – physical, mental and moral. To be certain, the Pakistan Army cannot win on the physical battlefield unless it also wins the mental combat, the ‘will to fight’ and the ‘belief in victory’.
So, what do the serving generals want? The same thing that any serving general in a state of war would want – support from all other pillars of the state. So, what do the Pakistani generals need to guarantee the longevity of the Pakistani state? The same thing that any serving general in a state of war needs – esprit de corps, sense of unity, commonality of interests plus chain of command and the confidence of the public on the military.
As of right now, one retired general, five retired lieutenant generals and two retired major generals are on trial – both in the courts of the law and the media. What do the retired generals want? They don’t want to be convicted – either by the courts or by the media. Well, there shouldn’t even be any debate on this count – anyone who breaks the law must be held responsible and punished.
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. Email: farrukh15@hotmail.com
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Believe it or not, a decisive majority in Pakistan believes – or so it did over two months ago – that a car can run on water. I am referring to a Gilani Research Foundation survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan in the aftermath of that bizarre claim by a Khairpur engineer that he had invented a device to use water as fuel to run a car. Equally bizarre was the response he got in the mainstream media, the ripples of which even touched some members of the federal cabinet. We had experts who vigorously joined the debate on both sides of the argument.
That issue, like others that momentarily flare up in our headlines and talk shows, has quietly died down. So I have no intention of reviving that hullabaloo. Irrespective of what it was all about from a scientific point of view, the ordinary people must have formed their opinions on the basis of what they saw and heard in the media – including the social media.
My concern is only about the formation of the collective mind. What do we hear from, to use the Urdu expression, zaban-e-khalq and how is this message related to facts and to the dictates of wisdom and rationality?
Back to the Gallup survey, as an example. The question posed to a nationally representative sample of men and women from across the four provinces was: “Some people think that this car actually runs on water while some people think that it is a fraud. What is your opinion on this?” As many as 69 percent believed in claims about the water-run car, 10 percent claimed it was a farce and 21 percent were uncertain.
Incidentally, the survey was released on September 6 this year – on the Defence of Pakistan Day. With this kind of public opinion, questions may be raised about the task of defending Pakistan. In any case, I was reminded of this survey – and the same question may yield different answers now – when I had a longish ride this week in a car sent for me for a meeting. It was from some rent-a-car agency. It allowed me to have a long conversation with the driver, who hailed from some place in the tribal belt and said that he had also been a driver in Afghanistan.
No, he did not profess any strong sympathy for the Taliban but his entire discourse was so fanciful and laden with contradictory opinions that were forcefully expressed. It made me afraid about how people like him could behave in certain situations. I would not try to repeat what he said except that he also firmly believes that it is not the Quaid’s body that is resting in his mausoleum in Karachi.
My intention is not to speak ill of the people who can be persuaded to believe that a car can run on water. Essentially, they are all very brave and deserve our respect because they have to fend for themselves and their families in very treacherous circumstances. They have to eke out a pitiable existence in a system that is thoroughly corrupt and unjust. In fact, if you genuinely empathise with the poor and the socially deprived people of Pakistan, you may yourself go crazy. That they continue to survive should make them our heroes.
That their passions and their opinions and their worldview can be entirely warped because of their limited knowledge and experiences is something else. I sometimes move around crowded bazaars or visit such places as a public hospital or the lower courts or bus terminals and wonder what they, the wretched of the earth, may be thinking and feeling. Why should we expect them to be sane and rational? Yet, they are supposed to be the staple of our democracy and the final arbiters of what ideas and which individuals will govern this country. Apparently, these choices will be made elsewhere, not in the minds of the awam we are so fond of putting on a pedestal.
At one level, the failure of our rulers, our media, our judiciary and all other institutions that may or may not be contending with each other, is colossal. They have not been able to protect the fundamental rights of the very poor and the very backward segments of our society. Many of our leaders have romantic notions about the tribal ways that are essentially rather primitive.
Simultaneously, we are under attack by the forces of evil that have certainly been strengthened by distortions lodged in the Pakistani mind. Suicide attacks, mostly owned by the Taliban, have continued. Sectarian violence has increased. The attack on the Rangers building in Karachi on Thursday, considering its magnitude, is awe-inspiring. And the Taliban have promised more of the same. In addition, Karachi has been conquered by organised crime and violence.
In these circumstances, we should carefully explore the role that the popular media has played in not only shaping the minds of the ordinary people but also in highlighting the dynamics of widespread poverty and intimations of anarchy and systemic collapse. Here, I need to reiterate that we get so obsessed by politics that we have no time to look at the state of our society.
What we recognise as social media has enhanced the prevailing confusion about the import of various seminal developments. So much distortion and disinformation is bandied about by subversive elements that it becomes difficult to rouse public opinion on an urgent issue. Take the example of the Malala incident, which provided the rulers with an opportunity to take bold action against terrorism and religious extremism. But doubts have now been planted in the minds of the people about what it was all about.
It is not enough to grieve over the present drift. More crucial is to understand our moral and intellectual deprivations and take emergency measures to restore the equilibrium of our society. Our political leaders should seek assistance from academics and researchers and social critics to try to comprehend the challenges confronting Pakistan. Total attention, say, to the statement made by the COAS and to the observations made by the chief justice is bound to camouflage the problems that surround and sway the directionless mobs that our society has nurtured.
If battles are fought in the minds of men, we should worry about the battle that we already have lost in the minds of our ordinary people. What is arrayed in this battlefield is not contending ideas or ideologies but monstrous conspiracies and ignorant biases. The mind is also the repository of the sanity of a person. In that sense, have we lost our senses?
The writer is a staff member. Email: ghazi_salahuddin@hotmail.com
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As the curtain rises for the second Obama presidential term, the immediate foreign policy priority will be the smooth withdrawal of US-led troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and ensuring that the insurgency-scarred country does not descend into complete chaos. There is no gainsaying the importance and centrality of Pakistan in this enterprise. It is undoubtedly in Islamabad’s own interest to skilfully employ whatever leverage it still has with the Afghan groups to persuade them to sort out their differences at the negotiating table, as only that will stave off the hideous possibility of civil war.
Last month, on Eid-ul-Azha, Mullah Omar issued a statement which commentators here believe indicated “important policy shifts.” None of them bothered to scratch the surface which would have demonstrated that, like all weak-minded men, the supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban lays an exaggerated emphasis on not changing his mind. He is convinced that, as the amir-ul-momineen (commander of the faithful), he is the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan for the rest of his life and any settlement of the conflict must be on his terms. This was the impression I gathered after several meetings with him from 1996 to 2000.
Those were fretful years in which I was involved in a shuttle mission aimed at persuading the Afghan groups to terminate their hostilities and agree on a mechanism for establishing a broad-based government reflecting the ethnic mosaic of the country. Some of these travels were life-threatening, and, on one occasion we survived narrowly as our aircraft was about to be shot down by the Northern Alliance over the skies of Mazar-e-Sharif. The incident was later recounted by Saleh Zafir of the Jang Group and Z A Qureshi of Pakistan Television who accompanied me on that eventful flight. Afghanistan has changed little since then, and the country continues to be ravaged by internal conflict.
In his Eid-ul-Azha message Mullah Omar has again affirmed: “We do not intend to grab power and nor, after the exit of foreign forces, [want to ignite] a civil war. Our efforts are centred on a political system that is in the hands of Afghans” free from external interference. This was more or less a rehash of his Eid-ul-Fitr message in August last year which was the most exhaustive statement he has ever made. In that message, which reads more like a papal encyclical, he announced: “The policy of the Islamic Emirate is not aimed at monopolising power since Afghanistan is the joint homeland of all Afghans,” and all citizens have the right to play a role in the “running of the country.”
Less than a month later, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president and the chief of the High Peace Council, was killed in Kabul by suicide bombers from one of the Taliban groups. His grief-stricken daughter, Fatima, reminisced how tragically ironical it was that only a week earlier, her father, a mild-mannered professor of theology, had attended a conference in Tehran on “Islamic Awakening” where “he had appealed to the ulema (religious scholars) to issue a fatwa (decree) against suicide bombings.”
The assassination, despite Mullah Omar’s assurances that he had no intention of “monopolising power,” is just one of many instances that shows how fractured the Taliban movement has become. Commanders act independently and ignore the orders of their supreme leader with ill-disguised disdain. This was glaringly apparent in the manner that Taliban fighters have violated the solemn pledges enshrined in the constitution promulgated by Mullah Omar. The main features of the document were published in the August 3, 2010, issue of Azadi, a Quetta-based newspaper.
The 35-page constitution, which contains 14 chapters and 85 clauses, stresses that jihad must be strictly in accordance with Islamic principles and “every mujahid” (holy warrior) is obliged to go the extra mile to “win a place in the hearts of the people...so that they have the prayers of the people with them.” Three days later the bodies of 10 men and women, all medical aid workers, were discovered by Afghan police in the northern province of Badakshan.
Another clause ordains that captured foreign troops must never be treated as hostages and, therefore, their release “in exchange for money is strictly forbidden.” The same paragraph enjoins the provision of “good facilities to the prisoners” and prohibits any form of torture, particularly the “cutting off of ears, noses and lips.” Five days later, the mutilated remains of two US Marines who had been captured by the Taliban the previous month in Logar province were recovered by the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Isaf).
The document emphatically asserts that informers and spies must not even be arrested, or harmed, without their being made aware of Islamic teachings and given an opportunity to repent. This did not stop the public hanging of a seven-year-old boy on preposterous charges of espionage. Around this time international media outlets carried unconfirmed reports that the Taliban leadership had instructed their fighters to kill or capture Afghan nationals, even women, if they cooperated with Isaf.
These ghastly incidents, despite the assurances in the constitution promulgated by the self-styled amir-ul-momineen, show that his authority is gradually being eroded. This was also conceded in March last year by his close confidante, Mullah Zabiullah, who said that the Taliban movement was in the throes of an unprecedented leadership crisis.
But despite this, Mullah Omar is by far the most powerful leader of Pakhtun-dominated southern and eastern Afghanistan, and all efforts to promote a settlement will have to be negotiated through his designated representatives. In his Eid-ul-Azha message he stated: “...we have established a specific office and a separate political panel...I wish to make it clear that besides that specific office, we have no other outlet for any reconciliation or political dialogue.” This is the same “committee” for the purpose of “making external and internal policies” that was envisaged in the constitution two years earlier.
Against this backdrop, Washington believes that Pakistan can play a pivotal role for the orderly withdrawal of US troops and the eventual stabilisation of Afghanistan. It is therefore probably not coincidental that in the last few days the US Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Marc Grossman, the State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland and Deputy Chief of the American embassy in Islamabad Richard Hoagland, have publicly affirmed that the Durand Line is the recognised international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
These pronouncements at this point in time are intriguing. In 2007, when Pakistan toyed with the idea of fencing its border with Afghanistan, former president Pervez Musharraf was discreetly but firmly advised by the Bush administration to abandon the project, as it would undermine the Karzai regime. The change in Washington’s declaratory policy on the Durand Line is therefore significant. Whatever the reason for this, it is vitally important for Pakistan to craft well-thought-through initiatives aimed at facilitating an intra-Afghan dialogue. The alternative is the intensification of the conflict in Afghanistan, which will have horrendous implications for the security situation in the adjacent tribal regions of Pakistan.
But persuading the Afghan groups to talk to each other has never been easy. A top-ranking foreign ministry official recently said that Mullah Omar was as “damned and elusive as the Scarlet Pimpernel” of Baroness Orczy’s literary masterpiece and there had been absolutely no contact with him for several months. One can only hope that he was lying through his teeth. The supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban has always prided himself on being a man of his word. His ideas for a settlement are spelt out in the constitution he promulgated in 2010, his Eid-ul-Fitr message of August 2011 and his recent statement on Eid-ul-Azha. These documents warrant serious study as they constitute a framework for negotiations among the Afghan factions.
The writer is the publisher of Criterion quarterly. Email: iftimurshed@ gmail.com
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Pakistan’s Canada-based ex-ambassador Muhammad Yunus in his book Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Introduction (OUP, 2003) has told us how different scholars have avoided theorising about national interest. He quotes Raymond Aron as saying that “it is a formula vague to the point of being meaningless or a pseudo-theory”.
In Pakistan, it is the army that decides strategy. The other institutions, like the government, simply adjust to it. Should we change this pattern? The following points are worth pondering:
1) Because the army was always dominant, a kind of ‘consensual national interest’ became frozen over the national security state, which meant a challenge to India and all those elements — like the nuclear programme — that underpinned it.
2) Is Kashmir an object of national interest? On the ground, it has faded away but in abstraction, it is there as a device to derail discussion over more practical issues.
3) In today’s world, power rather than any morality drives foreign policy. If a state is strong it will be sovereign. It will also have two qualities that will make it a de facto ‘big power’: the ability to resist coercion and the ability to coerce other states. National interest lies in achieving either or both conditions.
4) It is not an unforgivable sin to be a weak state. What should be the national interest of weak states? Contrary to what the nation thinks, it should not be harmed by the power projection of states it cannot oppose or resist.
5) National interest lies in seeking alliances that may break the isolation that enables the enemy-state to successfully harm it.
6) National interest lies in attaining the ability to achieve internal reform in order to avoid foreign pressure of all sorts.
7) National interest lies in avoiding international isolation to prevent other states from getting together within the United Nations to use international law to harm it.
8) Embracing pragmatism in the conduct of the state to come close to a theoretical basis for the understanding of the conduct of a weak state.
9) Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore is the philosopher of the new ‘national interest’ theory that is related solely to the national economy. He symbolises the transition of the nation state to a market state.
10) The ‘market’ states in most of Southeast Asia and the Far East seem to conduct themselves ‘pragmatically’ in the realm of foreign policy, reflected in their abstention from pronouncing an aggressive strategy.
11) Should the common man be the one to decide national interest? What the common man thinks is shaped by the indoctrination of the state. Political theory, developed since the rejection of democracy by philosophers in Athens, recommends ‘indirect representative democracy’ that keeps the common man away from the formulation of strategy.
12) State indoctrination is not geared to the reality of relative power enjoyed by the state vis-Ã -vis other states but to the myth of its own greatness in the abstract.
13) National interest should not be conflated with nationalism, which is in the domain of emotions that incline the state to the risk of war. National interest should relate to the economic vision of the country and should be achieved with pragmatism.
The writer is Director South Asian Media School, Lahore khaled.ahmed@tribune.com.pk
Published in The Express Tribune, November 11th, 2012.
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There are times when the distinction between the title and the individual ceases to exist, it is only the title. We have seen honourable judges refer to themselves as his Lordship, this does not come naturally to most of us, but then most of us are not their Lordships. The recent exchange between the two “Chiefs” is really about them being bigger than all of us, than the system itself.
The response to the statements is classic textbook ‘Stockholm syndrome’. The Army Chief has constantly been lauded for his commitment to democracy, which is a scared and polite way of saying that he has been kind enough not to impose martial law. This, of course, is perfect nonsense. The Army Chief is a government servant and is not supposed to impose martial law and take over governments. If he does so that is high treason. We do not have to thank everyone who has not committed a crime yet. He would have been fired in most other countries for speaking in this threatening tone of voice. The ISPR statement took more words to communicate to us the same message as a former intelligence chief said very concisely to a reporter on camera when he (the intelligence chief) said: “Shut up, idiot.” The subtext of the ISPR statement, which has also been voiced by many in the media and politicians is that taking too aggressive a stance on the conduct of retired army generals will somehow dampen the morale of the armed forces. I fail to see the force of this argument. All of us should and do dip our flags and salute our brave soldiers fighting the war of our survival and we remain indebted to them for their courage and sacrifices. However, it does not affect the resolve and intention to prosecute generals accused of financial corruption and rigging elections (which most probably is high treason). If anything, the “morale” of our troops will increase knowing that they have a leadership that is willing to uphold their oath and be loyal to the Constitution.
The Chief Justice constantly reminds us of the sacrifices that the present judiciary has made and how the road for all future martial law has forever been blocked. The doctrine of necessity has been buried, etc. A few obsolete maxims like, “judge only speaks through judgments”, etc. have to be disregarded in this courageous endeavour. Nobel sentiments, and one has no reason to doubt the word of My Lord. However, it is too strenuous. The only appropriate time to display (or not to) courage is when the moment arrives, and unfortunately, sooner or later, that time will come. Some particularly cynical people may also object to the Chief Justice taking this slogan on tour, addressing district bar councils and rallying troops. The press conference held by the Registrar of the Supreme Court in the Asghar Khan case is unprecedented; it is not clear if that will be the standard practice for all judgments from now on or if it was a one-off thing. The courts should be free in making any decisions that they deem fit;press conferences, however, are highly debatable. In any event, the good registrar is the Court’s answer to ISPR. Like the Army, the Court is extremely sensitive to criticism, and like the intangible “morale” of the troops, the Court believes unwanted criticism affects the “independence” of judiciary.
Maybe the two Chiefs are more alike than what first impressions would suggest. Prosecuting generals Beg and Durrani is an attack on the entire army; similarly, allegations against Doctor Arsalan is a conspiracy against all of the judiciary. It is always “us”, always the first person “plural”. Another unifying bond between the two Chiefs is dislike for politicians. This, along with their commitment to the “rule of law”, led to a common ground in the Memo scandal. The contempt for politicians is ironic considering the desire of both the Chiefs to be popular. Perhaps, they do not hate the game, just the present players. The press statements of the ISPR and those of the Registrar are meant to garner public support. Their job descriptions do not allow that, the perks, privileges, immunity of being a Judge or a General means that the desire to be popular has to be deferred till retirement. Political and policy statements is a two-way street, we will take you seriously when we can talk back. So, with the utmost of deference, in my opinion, both the Army Chief and the Chief Justice of Pakistan have disregarded red lines in making political statements.
Yet, there still maybe a bright side to this. The Army and the Court have remained on the same page up till now. It is said when Roman generals entered the city after a triumph, there was a man on the chariot whose only job was to whisper in the ear of the general, “Remember, you are only human.” In our case now, there is not one chariot, and there is no whispering; unfortunately, there is no triumph either. Still, the two Chiefs seem to be on parallel chariots competing fiercely and it is more like shouting, however, the message remains the same, “Remember, you are only human.” One hopes amidst all the noise both of them hear and understand that.
The writer is a lawyer and partner at Ijaz and Ijaz Co in Lahore saroop.ijaz@ tribune.com.pk
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Bihar, with a population of 103 million, is the third-most populous state of India. About 17 per cent of the population is Muslim, which makes Bihar host to the second-largest population of Muslims among the Indian states. Bihar had posted a compound annual growth rate of 16.71 per cent during 2011-12, which was the highest among the Indian states. Bihar’s spending on development increased tremendously during the past five years with the expenditure during this period being higher than the cumulative expenditure during the preceding 50 years.
Bihar’s landmark governance initiative has been the passing of the Right to Public Service Act in 2011, which guarantees 52 basic services to its citizens within a fixed timeframe. Citizens can demand these services as a right and penalties are prescribed for public office holders who fail to provide them within the prescribed time limit. The state received 20 million applications during the one year after the passage of the Act of which some 95 per cent were disposed of within the target time.
Another innovation is that of providing the right to information (RTI) to the marginalised and illiterate sections of society, which cannot make written applications to demand information. Now, any citizen can file an application for information using mobile phones and the state is obligated to provide it within 30 days. Call centres have been established to convert public calls into written RTI applications. It is worth noting that RTI has assumed the scale of a movement in India and is extensively used by citizens.
Pakistan, which faces tremendous challenges when it comes to getting children vaccinated, especially against polio, can learn from Bihar, which has succeeded in increasing the percentage of full immunisation from 18.6 per cent in 2005 to 66.8 per cent in 2012. No fresh case of polio has been detected in Bihar since September 2010.
Pakistan and India have discussed issues such as Kashmir, Siachen, river waters, trade and terrorism for many years. However, public issues such as education, health, poverty eradication, right to services, etc, are new and welcome items on the menu.
As Kumar completes his second consecutive term as chief minister after serving six terms in the Lok Sabha and holding portfolios in the Union cabinet, he is being widely tipped as one of the most potent candidates for the future premier of India. His visit to Pakistan and exchange of views with top political leaders will provide him with necessary insight into Pakistan-India relations. Now that Pakistan is transforming itself into a stable democracy, the challenges of providing good governance under a democratic set-up may be easier to face by learning from each other. The goals of peace and friendship can be achieved not only by holding dialogues on bilateral issues but also by sharing experiences on good governance.
The writer is president of the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, which facilitated the visit of Pakistani parliamentarians to Bihar in August 2012
Published in The Express Tribune, November 11th, 2012.
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If political questions are allowed to fester long enough they transform themselves into legal questions. In a polity where the system of governance crumbles, proliferation of legal disputes is natural. And courts can’t be faulted for adjudicating legal disputes brought before them merely because they emerged from political questions. It is indisputable that the Supreme Court has the final word in declaring rights and obligations of citizens and the state. It is also indisputable that the SC has the final word in interpreting the constitution. But the fact that the SC is the ultimate arbiter of disputes and interpreter of the law does not mean it doesn’t get things wrong.
Critiquing the SC’s rulings neither amounts to questioning the validity nor the authority of the court. But just because rulings of the apex courts are binding doesn’t mean they are right. And just because the judiciary is vested with constitutional authority doesn’t mean it is being discharged unerringly. The law being developed and the manner in which the judiciary approaches its constitutional mandate are matters of public importance that must be debated vigorously since it affects all of us.
The interim rulings of the SC in the CNG case and the Balochistan law and order case highlight problems inherent in the exercise of the apex court’s now-dilated powers under Article 184(3) of the constitution. The popular argument (that a vacuum has been created due to failure of governance in the country, which by necessity has to be filled by other state institutions) used to justify the inflated role of the SC is neither a legal argument nor a useful guide to interpreting the scope of Article 184(3)’s powers.
Starting with the CNG case, the argument that the SC didn’t fix the reduced CNG price in its order but only recorded the federal government’s statement on the estimated reduced price is disingenuous. Even if we disregard the atmosphere in Court 1, where pushing a line disagreeable to the court can become very unpleasant for the summoned civil servants, why did the court need to record the reduced price as part of its order that had been predicted by the ministry, when the operative part of the order was a direction issued to Ogra to determine what the CNG sale price ought to be?
Once such indicated price made it into the SC order could Ogra exercise any discretion or exhibit the audacity to reach a different conclusion? And when Ogra goes ahead and underwrites the price that has the SC’s tacit approval, what legal remedy will those CNG station operators have who are aggrieved by such a decision of the regulator? More importantly, in ordering Ogra to determine a reasonable price as part of its interim order, did the SC not prejudge the underlying legal issue: does Ogra have the legal authority to determine the sale price of CNG?
Let’s recall the CNG price issue. Prior to the execution of the MoU between Ogra and CNG station operators, which fixed the sale price of CNG and allowed an obnoxious profit to CNG retailers, the price of CNG was determined through open competition between CNG stations. In the recent hearing before the SC, the federal government submitted that the MoU with CNG stations was illegal and was being suspended by the government. It didn’t say why it had been entered into in the first place or who was responsible for authorising and executing such a pernicious agreement that produced windfall for CNG station owners at the cost of consumers.
The obvious questions that come to mind are: By entering into this MoU did Ogra exercise its public authority unfairly? Has Ogra been in a state of regulatory capture unduly benefiting CNG station owners and, if so, who are the public servants who ought to be held to account? Does Ogra have the legal authority to fix CNG retail prices? Was this MoU a prohibited agreement under competition law that manipulated prices and restricted competition? The SC, with its zealous focus on the sale price of CNG, didn’t get into any of these questions.
Ogra has been issuing CNG sale price notifications under Section 43B of the Ogra Ordinance. This was introduced through the Ogra Amendment Ordinance 2009, which was laid before the parliament on April 10, 2009, but never became an act of parliament and consequently lapsed. With its lapse, amendments were hurriedly introduced in the 1992 CNG Rules (issued under a 1948 mines and oilfields control law), to reclaim CNG retail price-fixing authority for Ogra. The legal validity of these rules remains dubious. But Ogra hasn’t been fixing prices pursuant to these rules. It has been doing so under Section 43B of the Ogra Ordinance that simply doesn’t exist anymore.
So why order Ogra to fix CNG retail price without first determining if it has the legal authority to do so and what legal recourse does anyone who is aggrieved by the order now have? This highlights the twin problems of Article 184(3): when the SC elects to become the court of first instance, legal infirmities easily creep into its orders compromising the law being produced by our apex court; and more than producing bad jurisprudence, the decision of the SC to act as a court of first instance, while also being the ultimate court of the land, robs aggrieved parties of their right to appeal and consequently of their due process rights.
The Balochistan law and order ruling raises questions not only about the approach of the court to constitutional interpretation but also a flawed doctrine of democracy being propounded by the court. The SC has continued to emphasise more recently that none of the state institutions, including the judiciary, have any inherent powers. The only power they have flows from the text of the constitution. And yet in many rulings produced by the SC, including the Balochistan ruling, there is hardly any mention or interpretation of the text of the constitutional provision upon which the order relies.
Which provision of the constitution vests in the SC the authority to declare that if public office holders serving in a provincial government fail to discharge their obligation to uphold fundamental rights of citizens, the entire government loses its ‘constitutional authority’ to govern? In the Asghar Khan case, where the army chief and DG ISI were found to have violated the constitution and fundamental rights, the court is at pains to explain that their acts were personal and the institution they represented wasn’t culpable. So why are the acts or omissions of Balochistan government’s officials not personal?
While the SC can affix the legal responsibility of individual public office holders, does the constitution empower it to affix collective responsibility of an elected government or rule that such government has lost its legitimacy? In the 18th Amendment cases we saw the SC wading into the province of the legislature, despite clear prohibition in Article 239 to the contrary. We have also seen the SC reduce the role of the parliamentary committee on judicial appointments to a post office. Don’t these rulings when viewed together project a disconcerting judicial approach to democracy and trichotomy of state power?
The wisdom of the idea that democracy and rule of law go hand in hand is as relevant for the judiciary as it is for parliament and the executive. Khaki-rule doesn’t become representative because people yield to martial law. Likewise our SC cannot presume to possess representative credentials merely because a popular movement backed its restoration. The authority that the SC claims or the orders that it passes cannot be grounded in public expectations but must spring from the text of the law and the constitution. By definition, commitment to rule of law demands fidelity to legal texts, which is seen wanting in Article 184(3) jurisprudence of the SC.
(Concluded)
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu
Published in The News , November 10th, 2012.
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The government, the judiciary and the army at crossroads
Now
it is official – the amount disbursed by the omnipresent establishment
to politicians for creation of an anti-PPP alliance, the Islami Jamhoori
Ittehad (IJI), to effectively rig the 1990 general elections. The names
given in the list provided by one of the ring leaders, the then ISI
Chief Lt General Asad Durrani, to the Supreme Court in the Asghar Khan
case read like the ‘who is who’ list of politicians intriguing against
the PPP at the time.
Those mentioned in the detailed judgment of the apex court include such luminaries as Pir Pagara, Nawaz Sharif, Mohammad Khan Junejo, Abida Hussain, Mustafa Khar, Mustafa Jatoi, Mir Afzal and a number of pro-General Zia-ul-Haq journalists. None of the politicians, with the honourable exception of Abida Hussain, has admitted to their crime.
The apex court has ordered legal proceedings against the politicians who received the tainted money. It has directed the Federal investigation agency (FIA) to conduct a transparent investigation against the recipients. Against those whom there was sufficient evidence, the court has ordered trial according to law.
The real tricky part is not proceeding against the recipients but the conspirators. The ringleader is supposedly the late Ghulam Ishaq Khan who, as chairman Senate, was appointed president after Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash on 6 August, 1988. This was not without the blessings of General Mirza Aslam Beg who at the same time being VCOAS chose to become the COAS.
Aslam Beg, in several television interviews after the short verdict of the Supreme Court, has denied any knowledge of the whole conspiracy, glibly claiming that the ISI was directly under GIK and did not report to him.
The maverick former COAS has washed his hands of the whole affair by claiming that he learnt about the scandal four years after his retirement. What a lie! No one in his right mind would believe that the all powerful army chief of the time was timidly taking orders from a president virtually appointed by him.
The apex court in its detailed judgment has, however, clearly stated that both Asad Durrani and Aslam Beg brought a bad name to Pakistan and its armed forces as well as secret agencies in the eyes of the nation. Not buying Beg’s weak defence for his unlawful behaviour, the apex court clearly states that the soldier is clearly liable under the constitution if he violates his oath.
The operative part of the verdict is rather ominous and clearly puts the federal government on the spot. It states: notwithstanding that they (Beg and Asad Durrani) may have retired from service, the federal government shall take necessary steps under the constitution and law against them.
There are only two ways Beg and Durrani can be proceeded against. The obvious is that they should be tried under Article 6 of the constitution for committing high treason by violating and subverting it. This route is slippery and fraught with minefields for an incipient and docile civilian setup.
President Zardari till now has been careful not to alienate the army. That is why he has survived his near full term. In a culture where a usurper like Musharraf was given a guard of honour when he left the country for permanent exile, it is unlikely that the military hierarchy would allow trial of their former colleagues by civilians.
Another manner the former generals could be tried is by initiating court martial proceedings against them. The army chose to court martial retired generals found implicated in the National Logistics Cell (NLC) scam by technically reinstating them.
The problem, however, is that the Chief Justice of Pakistan has ordered the government, not the military, to put those (retired) officers who have brought a bad name to the armed forces and the nation on trial.
In the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s verdict and subsequent “media bashing” of the army, General Kayani has issued a statement which has raised more questions than answering them. The COAS is apparently miffed at perceived attempts to “create a distinction between the army leadership and the troops”.
What is the nature of these attempts, if at all they were made? He has failed to specify. Without naming the apex court, Kayani declared that no individualor institution could define the national interest.
It is obvious that the military leadership is visibly upset at attempts to bring accountability to its doorsteps. Attempts by National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the Supreme Court’s verdict in Asghar Khan case and orders in the missing persons case implicating former generals and intelligence agencies are a first in Pakistan.
Nawaz Sharif has issued a ‘goody goody’ statement on the issue saying that the army was a symbol of the country’s solidarity and hence he wanted to see the institution united and strong. Coming out strong for strengthening the judiciary as well, he was of the opinion that weakening the institution was like turning the country into a lawless jungle.
Unlike General Kayani who did not name the media, Sharif urged the media to paly a positive role. It is obvious that as in the past the effort is to shoot the messenger, rather than judging the message in the context of our unsavoury history.
Nawaz’s own record regarding the three institutions, the army, judiciary and the media, is pretty dismal. As prime minister, he did his best to damage all three. Let us hope that if he ever gets a chance again he would be a reformed person learning from past mistakes.
The Supreme Court’s recent orders in Balochistan target killing case and law and order in Karachi has raised alarm bells in legal circles. It is a dangerous precedent for the Supreme Court to declare, no matter how true, that the government owing to its incompetence has failed to discharge its constitutional obligations.
In a review petition filed in the apex court, the federal government has stated somewhat correctly that the apex court impliedly wants the federal government to either take direct control or impose governor’s rule in Balochistan. According to the plea, this is tantamount to reviving Article 58(2) (b).
After the eighteenth amendment in the constitution, the president can no longer exercise such draconian powers. In any case such a course, if sanctified, could lead to be used against any province, including Punjab, on the pretext of a real or perceived threat to law and order.
The SC verdict in Asghar Khan’s case has serious implications for the presidency as well. The president holding dual office has already been challenged in the Lahore High Court.
The apex court declaring that the office of the president cannot be used for politicking makes things difficult for President Zardari right at elections time.
The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today
A pointed statement by the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, has sent politicians and media scurrying for cover. It is as though, to translate an Urdu phrase, they have all sniffed a snake and would like to stay clear of it.
General Kayani didn't take names. But he did point the finger at the Supreme Court and the media and accused them of transgressing the limits of their authority and freedom, thereby undermining the writ and credibility of the army and affecting its morale adversely.
In terms of the judiciary, General Kayani's allusion was to the ISI case in which the SC held former army chief General Aslam Beg and former DGISI General Asad Durrani guilty of violating the constitution by rigging the 1990 elections and ordered the federal government to prosecute them accordingly.
The SC has angered the military in other unprecedented ways too. The CJP has taken a particularly hard line on the violation of citizens' fundamental rights by the military and its agencies in Balochistan and FATA. The FC, ISI and MI have received an earful from the CJP. In their black and white worldview, they are combating a separatist foreign-inspired insurgency in Balochistan and Al-Qaeda-Taliban terrorism in FATA that are unrelenting in exacting serious military and civilian casualties. Instead of being appreciated for working in a very difficult environment, they believe they have been unfairly castigated for their troubles. They are not used to it, they don't like it and they have told their Chief how they feel.
The SC and the media are held jointly responsible for exposing a former DG-ISI, General Javed Ashrad Qazi, and two other retired generals in the Musharraf era to hostile public scrutiny over the controversial privatization of urban land owned by Pakistan Railways in Lahore to make room for a luxury Golf Club in Lahore. NAB is investigating the three generals for alleged kickbacks in facilitating the deal. Naturally, they are hopping mad.
The media is also in the army chief's firing line. One case refers to three retired generals in charge of the NLC who lost Rs 4 billion of public money by unwise and unauthorized investments in the stock market. The military says they will be re-employed into the army, investigated and face a court martial. The media accuses the army of protecting its own unfairly.
The media has also targeted General Kayani himself. It has speculated that he is angling for another extension in tenure. This is coupled with a whispering campaign against two brothers of General Kayani for allegedly cornering lucrative projects in government.
General Kayani is also feeling defensive over some other issues. The military was severely embarrassed by the Raymond Davis affair and the US Navy Seal raid to kill OBL on May 2. Its attempt to derive mileage out of Memogate backfired because its chief witness wasn't credible. So did its decision to halt NATO supplies and whip up anti-Americanism because of drone strikes because it had to restore NATO supplies and couldn't stop the drones for the sake of retaining a working relationship with the US.
Last year, the military indirectly sought a gagging order on the media from the SC when it was smarting from the public backlash of the US Navy Seal raid. But the court has only now fished the case out for hearing when the media is firing on all cylinders and sees this case as a futile and foolish attempt to encroach on its hard won freedom.
It is unprecedented for nine top generals - two former army chiefs and two ex-DGs-ISI - to be in the dock. The internal pressure on General Kayani to stop this dangerous slide into civilian supremacy and accountability has clearly provoked him to fire a warning shot across the bows of the government, opposition, media and judiciary.
General Kayani has vouched his anti-civilian statement by prefacing it with a mea culpa of sorts. Yes, he says, the military has made mistakes. Yes, he says, it doesn't have a monopoly of defining the national interest. But there is no concrete evidence that the military is ready to define a new paradigm for Pakistan and civil-military relations or that it is talking from, and about, a higher plane of discourse and national security.
There's the rub. For the first time in Pakistan's history, there is a consensus in civil society, government, opposition, media, judiciary and bureaucracy that the military cannot call the shots any more and civilians must take charge of the destiny of their nation, for better or for worse.
It is also true that the pendulum seems to be swinging too fast and too furiously against the military for political comfort in a difficult existential moment for Pakistan when all state actors need to be on the same page. Therefore the judiciary, media and military should take stock and learn to pull their punches in the larger national interest.
Published in The Friday Times, November 10th, 2012.
First and foremost is the issue of reassessing the state’s strategic goals and changing the manner in which such decisions are made. I would imagine that the ‘Taliban’ was being used by the superior court as a generic term which includes all sorts of jihadi groups operating in Karachi, in particular, and Sindh province in general. The Court must ask how and why the jihadis are so comfortably ensconced in Sindh which is reputed for its strong Sufi tradition. For example, there is now the Lashkar-e-Taiba, spreading its network in upper Sindh, especially in areas where there is a Hindu population. Then there are others like the Sipah-e-Sahaba who are spreading their tentacles as well. At this pace it can be safely assumed that the cultural character of Sindh will undergo a change in the next five to ten years.
In Karachi itself, some of the friendly jihadi outfits are now resurfacing like the Jaish-e-Muhammad, which once had greater say in the affairs of the city but then went partly underground for a while. Some segments of the state are even gently arming and training militant groups, perhaps, to counter the non-religious violence and force of Karachi’s main political party.
Solving the Taliban issue in Karachi and the country at large will have to begin with the question of how and why does the state persist in arming groups, and then creates even more groups to counter/challenge those made earlier. More important, the superior court has to question the mechanism of strategic decision-making in the country — especially how are decisions to make and support militant groups made and who makes them? If put under a microscope, the Supreme Court will realise that it is not the political government which can be held responsible for the mess.
Second, at an operational level, can the problem be solved through improving the performance of the police? Indubitably, the police have to perform their duty and make sure cars with dubious licence plates do not operate in the city, or anywhere in the country. However, there is a larger debate which needs to be opened up on how much should the state and society commit to law enforcement as opposed to the amorphous military security that poses as national security? We often forget that law enforcement, especially policing, is more of a public good that requires serious intellectual and financial investment. The policeman doing his job needs to have the confidence that every time he apprehends a criminal or a “Taliban”, the culprit will not be freed with just one phone call or that people in authority will not come and secretly whisk away the culprit. You can give plenty of weapons to the police but unless they are empowered and trained to take action they will not have the confidence to do so. Policing is now almost a science and should be dealt with in this manner.
Intervention from the top, however, is not a police man’s only frustration. He is totally impotent in the face of a judicial process and system that depends on archaic methods of dealing with terrorism or other crimes. The fact is that Pakistan’s rate of conviction in terrorism cases is abysmal. The current legal system lays emphasis on the first information report (FIR) and identification of the convict by the complainant or affected. So, a case becomes automatically weak if a name is not there in the initial FIR or there is no one to do physical identification, known as shanakht parade. But how do the police produce an identifier, for instance, in the case of a suicide attack? Resultantly, there are cases after cases in which terrorists were arrested but then freed by courts because the evidence did not meet the specified parameters. Over 30 FIRs were registered in the Lal Masjid case and these are still pending, waiting for evidence, or dismissal — which is more likely to happen.
Even when there is evidence, as in the case of Malik Ishaq accused of committing about 70 murders, it were delays and hitches in the legal system that allowed enough time to pass and as that happened, the police officer and others who contributed to his being charged and eventually convicted, by a lower court, for being involved in the attack on the Khana-e-Farhang-e-Iran in Multan were targeted and killed. Interestingly, the judge, who had convicted Ishaq, left the country hours after he wrote the judgment. What is even more intriguing is the fact that the highest appellate court in this case, which is the Supreme Court, did not consider some of the evidence admissible and because of that Ishaq was freed. Some sources even talk about threats to senior judges as the case came up for hearing.
The Supreme Court is quite right in asking the government to pull up the police. But what the judges must also understand is that fighting the Taliban is a highly intense and integrated process that will not happen until all stakeholders come together, decide that they intend to fight this battle, and re-evaluate the operational mechanism of their respective institutions. The judiciary has a critical role to play in this and when some judges themselves have a reputation of being latent-radical, then the battle can’t be fought, let alone won. Perhaps, the senior judges may read decisions as in the Mukhtaran Mai case once again to assess how their notions of justice and what is right and wrong are so problematic that a battle against terrorism can’t be waged. The said decision is not about individual conservatism but about a certain mindset that can only strengthen the Taliban.
The writer is an independent social scientist and author of Military Inc.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 10th, 2012.
Taliban activities may have originally begun in these areas but they have, long since, spread their vicious tentacles throughout the country with southern Punjab often being pointed to as a Taliban stronghold, even though there is much controversy about the accuracy of those supporting this school of thought. And now, long after having established themselves in Karachi, Interior Minister Rehman Malik has finally acknowledged Taliban presence there and claims that something will be done about them which, coming from this gentleman is, as always, best taken with a pinch of the proverbial salt.
The fact of the matter is that either pure Taliban or a growing number of people exhibiting dyed-in-the-wool ‘Taliban tendencies’, are now to be found in almost every nook and cranny of the country. If, those of other persuasions — and one sincerely hopes that this is the majority — would take off their blinkers, open their eyes and accept the truth before it raises itself up and violently hits them in the face, would be far better off lest they get blown to kingdom come.
Signs of what can, quite literally, be considered ‘Talibanisation’ have been evident for some years now and are not only spreading but are fast becoming firmly entrenched in the largely uneducated mindset that prevails. As sickening as it is to admit, this is actively encouraged by a government, which does absolutely zilch to promote equal education for all and under its rule, the Taliban have destroyed, literally, hundreds of schools over recent years and educational standards have suffered a massive downfall.
Much of the media, too, is guilty of ‘under-reacting’ to the spread of the Taliban, and ‘Talibanisation’ in general, as few journalists have taken the trouble to analyse the growing menace from a seriously sensible point of view. Instead, in some misguided cases, they have opted to promote rather than decry those responsible for carrying out atrocities under the Taliban banner. The media segment, which has stood up and spoken out against the Taliban, particularly in condemning the attack on 15-year-old Malala, is now under threat itself with those located in Peshawar — now a no-go city for many — bearing the brunt and having to relocate to high security areas which, as history has proven time and time again, are never as secure as they are considered to be.
With targeted assassinations of anti-Taliban peace workers becoming more commonplace by the day, a general population that blindly refuses to see the writing on the wall, a failed educational system and a media under threat, Pakistan will soon be renamed ‘Talibistan’ unless there is an immediate awakening and necessary change is put in place.
The writer is author of The Gun Tree: One Woman’s War (Oxford University Press, 2001) and lives in Bhurban.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 10th, 2012.
“THE army chief does not express personal opinion. Whatever he says is the collective view of his institution.”
These were General Jahangir Karamat’s words a few hours after he ceased being Pakistan’s chief of army staff; his tenure prematurely over after his controversial call for the setting up of a National Security Council.
In his second term in office, a ‘heavily mandated’ Nawaz Sharif wasn’t willing to brook any ‘nonsense’. He asked for his army chief’s resignation. A BBC colleague suggested we try and get the general’s view.
We called Army House from London expecting a rebuff. But the operator put us through to Gen Karamat in the shock and confusion that must have followed the chief’s decision. The general denied he was sacked: “I resigned because I didn’t want this controversy to damage the country”.
I put it to him: “Was the NSC statement your personal opinion or did it represent the collective wisdom of the army?” He responded with his “collective view” statement.
We also interviewed Sharif’s top aide Mushahid Husain. With unmistakable triumphalism, he said the decision showed who was boss.
It wasn’t long before it emerged that many generals, and most notably the CGS (chief of general staff) Lt-Gen Ali Kuli Khan (Khattak) who was in Peshawar for the day,
later protested to the chief that he had decided to go quietly and not allowed them to sort out the government.
Sharif handpicked Lt-Gen Pervez Musharraf because he was advised his choice didn’t have a big constituency in the army, given his ethnic origins. Therefore, he would remain grateful at being elevated and follow orders without question.
It wasn’t long before the all-powerful prime minister found out how wrong he was. After a disastrous Kargil misadventure and continued defiance, when he tried to sack the army chief, he was overthrown, jailed and exiled.
Whether it was an ‘individual’s decision’ or the collective will of the institution manifesting itself, Pakistan was going to be set back another 10 years as, following in the footsteps of Ayub and Zia, Musharraf declared himself the monarch.
Frankly, as the Supreme Court proceedings in the Asghar Khan case and its ruling demonstrated, even when the army wasn’t directly, blatantly in power, it or its key individuals were still controlling most of the levers of power, even to the extent of manipulating elections.
In fact, just before the PPP government was sent packing in 1990, I was working for the Herald and wrote a story on how politicised even Gen Beg’s spouse was. Addressing a Rawalpindi Garrison Women’s Club meeting, she let loose on PPP’s ‘atrocities on the poor Mohajirs in Sindh’.
The PPP had already had to climb a mountain to form a government as another ‘individual’, the then ISI chief, had created an alliance to block its progress in the 1988 elections.
Anyway, after I wrote the Herald story on Mrs Beg, the then corps commander in Karachi requested a meeting. Gen Asif Nawaz Janjua was a bellicose officer who was supposed to be feared. As one prone to living dangerously, I agreed.
Ushered into his office and introductions over, the aides left the room. The general didn’t offer me a seat. I pulled a chair and lowered myself into it anyway. He reached into a drawer, pulled out a copy of the Herald with each of my stories marked by a coloured flag.
“Yaar, what’s this?” He barked, opening the page to the Mrs Beg story. “The chief called me from ‘Pindi. He was very upset.” I responded: “Is it untrue? If the chief wants he can issue a denial. But I have a number of witnesses who heard the speech.”
The general almost exploded: “I am sure she said it. But national interest bhi koyee cheez hotee hai (is also something). Do you have to report everything?” My current sense of realism, pragmatism … Ok, Ok … cowardice was still several years away. No family, no material possessions, nothing to lose.
“General, I thought this was going to be a grown-up conversation, a meeting to share our respective perspectives. Not a lecture on national interest. Had I known, I wouldn’t have bothered to come.” I started to get up.
The corps commanders, or at least Gen Asif Nawaz, had desks the size of football fields.
The big, burly officer got up and started to storm round his colossal desk. I rose to my full five-foot-nothing frame and braced myself. As he neared, I saw a half-raised right hand. Then I realised he was offering me his hand as he said: “Good. Now we understand each other perfectly.”
There was no mention of my journalism anymore and none either of national interest. He ordered tea, biscuits and a friendly chat followed. All my quirky views were heard without a frown. Things have moved on over the past two decades.
Now, Gen Kayani voluntarily says he has no monopoly over defining national interest. He says there is a need for all to follow the constitution. He acknowledges mistakes have been made in the past but calls for the rule of law to deal with those at this ‘defining moment’ in our nation’s history.
The army chief’s statement and the chief justice’s apparent retort to that have been described as ominous signs of this and that. I firmly believe that the past is another country. It will haunt us but we’ll never return to it.
I don’t feel the need to qualify criticism of the military by paying a perfunctory tribute to the several thousand soldiers who have laid down their lives valiantly battling the forces of darkness. Where I stand ideologically, they are my heroes anyway.
As for whether some generals indulged in corrupt practices or are clean as a whistle, we’ll wait for the due process of law to tell us. But we won’t abandon, or abdicate, our right to ask questions because a former head of ISI says: “Shut up, idiots.”
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn , November 10th, 2012.